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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 DECEMBER 1955 No. 2 
JUDGES AND THE CRIME BURDEN 
I ohn Barker Waite* 
ONE does not happily charge the judiciary with responsibility for the country's burden of crime, but the responsibility 
does in fact exist. Judges, though they may not encourage crime, 
interfere with its prevention in various ways. They deliberately 
restrict police efficiency in the discovery of criminals. They ex-
empt from punishment many criminals who are discovered and 
whose guilt is evident. More seriously still, they so warp and alter 
the public's attitude toward crime and criminals as gravely to 
weaken the country's most effective crime preventive. 
I 
Let me elaborate, first, their interference with police efficiency 
and the frequency with which they refuse to punish. One might 
expect that rules of proper police conduct and what the police 
may or may not do in arresting suspected criminals or seeking 
evidence of their guilt would be established by legislative enact-
ment. Some very definite rules have been so created. But, in 
addition, judges have themselves imposed other and far more 
narrowly restrictive limitations on police activity. Then, having 
created these limitations, they themselves undertake to assure 
police obedience to them. To this end they ignore the possibili-
ties of direct action against individual officers and proceed by in-
direction. Judges of the federal courts and those in eighteen of 
the states1 have evolved a policy of rebuking police who trans-
• Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Professor 
Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan-Ed. 
1 The appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 ( 1949), lists 16 states 
as following the federal rule of exclusion. An analysis of state decisions appears in 35 
MINN. L. REv. 457 (1951). Delaware came into the federal fold in 1950, Rickards v. 
Delaware, 45 Del. 573, 77 A. (2d) 199 (1950). 
California repudiated its old practice and adopted the federal rule of exclusion, pos-
sibly because of the invitation of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 
74 S.Ct. 381 (1954), in 1955. People v. Cahan, (Cal. 1955), 282 P. (2d) 905. Compare 
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435 (1922); Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. (2d) 399 
at 412, 49 P. (2d) 832 (1935): "In approving use of such evidence in this case, this court 
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gress the limitations by reversing the conviction of criminals dis-
covered through the transgression. Any evidence of guilt so ob-
tained must, these courts insist, be suppressed and kept from the 
knowledge of trial juries. Justices of the Supreme Court, indeed, 
have gone farther; knowledge of fact gained, through judicially 
forbidden police practice is not to be used for the public safety 
in any way.2 
This odd procedure of exempting known criminals from pun-
ishment as a means of keeping the police in order has been dis-
cussed, applauded, or condemned by many commentators.3 So 
far as I am aware, however, no one has compiled the full extent 
of the judge-made restrictions, which in its breadth seems more 
disturbing than when one or two restrictions are viewed indi-
vidually. 
None of the judicial decisions here discussed were forced upon 
the courts by extraneous authority; all are matters of judicial 
choice. Though in the verbiage of some judicial expression the 
judicial restrictions on police efficiency might appear to be the 
consequence of constitutional prohibitions, they are in truth judi-
cially, not constitutionally, created. Constitutions forbid "un-
reasonable" searches and seizures, but they do not themselves 
define what is unreasonable; that is left to judicial opinion.4 Hence 
does not approve or condone the reprehensible and nefarious acts employed in the securing 
of such evidence, but in fact strongly condemns such tactics. In this proceeding, however, 
we are solely interested in determining whether the evidence, no matter how secured, 
indicates that Herrscher has committed acts warranting discipline." 
2 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 at 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920): 
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that 
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not 
be used at all." See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 103 (1939), where 
the evidence was obtained in disregard of a statutory prohibition. 
But compare Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 75 S.Ct. 354 (1954), where use of 
the information for purposes of impeaching the defendant's credibility in another case was 
approved, two justices dissenting. 
3 See note 78 infra. 
4 "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula ..• and, 
regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions 
of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of 
each case." Minton, J., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 at 63, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950), 
citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 at 357, 51 S.Ct. 153 (1930). 
"The constitutional expression 'unreasonable searches' is not fixed and absolute in 
meaning. The meaning in some degree must change with changing social, economic, and 
legal conditions." Milam v. United States, (4th Cir. 1924) 296 F. 629 at 631. 
"The correct decision of each [case] depends not so much upon a higher critical exam-
ination of the accumulated decisional gloss as upon a common sense determination of 
whether, within the meaning of the word the Constitution uses, the particular search and 
seizure has been 'unreasonable.'" In re Ginsberg, (2d Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 749 at 750. 
"The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms.'' Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145 at 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947). 
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judges have been able to translate their personal notions of im-
proper conduct into plausible constitutional restrictions by the 
simple epithetical process of characterizing what they disapprove 
of as "unreasonable" and then declaring it forbidden by the Con-
stitution. 
This fact, that while the Constitution does forbid unreason-
able searches it does not indicate what constitutes unreasonable 
search, appears to have been forgotten by some commentators. 
One, for example, referring to the attitudes of the various justices, 
said, "The reconstituted Court seems to leave Justices Frankfurter 
and Jackson in a clear minority to deny encroachments upon the 
Amendment .... "5 The implicit suggestion that Justices Clark, 
Minton and the rest are inclined to approve "encroachments," by 
which I assume must be meant "violations" of the Constitution, 
is impossible of acceptance. The differences of judicial opinion 
can be nothing more than disagreement as to what specific searches 
are or are not "unreasonable," hence do or do not violate the 
prohibition-matters of definition, not of permitted "encroach-
ment" on the Constitution. 
Some of the judge-made restrictions have been fairly well 
clarified by repeated utterance, but the extent to which they do 
represent personal opinion is strikingly illustrated by judicial 
disagreement over their application. Justice Clark, referring to 
a similar problem of due process, expressed the situation pointed-
ly: "The practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that 
when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by police action, a con-
viction is overturned and a guilty man may go free." 6 
.The practice of compelling obedience to judicial restrictions 
by concealing truth from juries was likewise evolved by the judges 
themselves. Even though a search be unquestionably "unreason-
able" and therefore prohibited by the Constitution, nothing in 
the Constitution says what the consequence shall be. Just as the 
matter of what constitutes "unreasonable" search is left to judicial 
decision, so the consequence of such search when it does occur is 
likewise left to judicial decision, in the absence of legislative 
enactment. Justice Black has said, "The federal exclusionary rule 
is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially 
5 Reynard, "Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Consti-
tutional Right?" 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950) (italics added). As to various judicial attitudes 
the article is worth reading. 
6 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 at 138, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). 
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created rule of evidence. . . . "1 The soundness of the position 
that suppression of evidence is not required by the Constitution 
is confirmed by the number of state courts which do not exclude 
the evidence despite the similarity of the state and federal con-
stitutions. 8 
Although the constitutional provisions are broad enough in 
their phrasing to cover searches by any person whosoever, the 
Supreme Court has declined to apply its exclusionary rule to 
obviously unlawful-and in that sense unreasonable-search by 
private persons. 9 
1 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 33, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949), adding, "we hold, there-
fore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable seai:ch and 
seizure." So also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950). 
See also, Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1944). 
s E.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356 at 361, 138 N.E. 11 (1923): "Those 
[federal] decisions are not binding on this court in interpreting similar provisions of the 
Constitution of this Commonwealth." State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145 at 153, 195 N.W. 789 
(1923): " .•. the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court construing [the Fourth Amend-
ment] are not binding on the state courts when construing similar provisions in state 
constitutions." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 at 24, 150 N.E. 585 (1926): "We may not 
subject society to these dangers until the legislature has spoken with a clearer voice." 
See also Ex parte Mobile, 251 Ala. 539, 38 S. (2d) 330 (1949) and State v. Tonn, 195 
Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923), rejecting previous acceptance of the federal rule. 
Some state decisions, however, do speak of the exclusion as though forced on them 
by their constitutions, e.g., Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184, 105 S. 465 (1925); People v. Stein, 
265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933). Others seem to base inadmissibility of the evidence 
on the prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination, e.g., People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 
138 N.E. 728 (1923); Gore v. State,_24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923). 
Exclusion has been occasionally made a statutory rule. North Carolina session laws 
1951, c. 644, discussed 30 N.C.L. REv. 421 (1952) . 
. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952), anti-narcotic agents had 
used a microphone concealed on what the defendant's counsel called a stool pigeon to 
tranSmit to a listening agent statements by the accused concerning his selling of opium. 
Here Justice Frankfurter voices (at p. 761) a not uncommon "justification" of the exclu-
sion-not that the Constitution requires it, but that "my deepest feeling against giving 
legal sanction to such 'dirty business' as the record in this case discloses is that it makes 
for lazy and not alert law enforcement." The justice does not suggest by what cleaner 
method the evidence against narcotics peddlers could be obtained. 
So also in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 at 457, 69 S.Ct. 191 (1948), Justice 
Jackson seems to agree with Vinson, Burton and Reed that spying into a room through a 
transom was not technically a "search," although he does loosely speak of it as such, but 
disapproves use of the evidence because the manner of obtaining it showed "a shocking 
lack of all sense of proportion." 
9 "The Fourth Amendment's origin and history clearly show that it was intended as 
a restraint upon the activities of sovereigu authority, and was not intended to be a limita-
tion upon other than governmental agencies ..•. " Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 at 
475, 41 S.Ct. 574 (1921). Query: if Congress should attempt to protect "private" searchers 
from tort liability, would the Court hold the enactment constitutional? 
This limitation in the suppression of evidence to evidence obtained by police action 
led to a jolly little Prohibition game wherein state officers having evidence unusable in 
the state courts turned it over to federal police for use in federal courts-the state officers 
being mere private persons under the Burdeau v. McDowell notion. United States v. 
Diuguid, (2d Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 848: "The Fourth Amendment does not reach the 
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Contrary to popular belief, also, the issuance of a warrant for 
search or arrest is not required by constitutional provision as an 
essential of reasonableness. On the contrary, both searches and 
seizures without pretense of a warrant have consistently been 
recognized as reasonable and proper.10 
With this explanatory background of the decisions it should 
be interesting to consider what sort of police activities have suffi-
ciently revolted enough judges to call for rebuke by judicial sup-
pression of evidence discovered thereby. 
Searches of Houses 
One landmark case is Agnello v. United States.11 Here govern-
ment agents had seen Agnello bring cocaine from his house and 
deliver it to a purchaser. They arrested him, then went at once 
to his room and searched it. Because the can of cocaine they found 
there was used in evidence his conviction was reversed. The 
defense counsel set up a puzzling contention that the search must 
be considered "unreasonable" because a search warrant would 
not have been issued had it been asked for-a proposition which, 
were it accepted, would mean that search without a warrant was 
unreasonable, no warrant could be lawfully issued, hence lawful 
search for Agnello's dangerous hoard would be legally impossible. 
The Court did not expressly pass judgment on that position. 
Neither did it refer to the fact that had the agents delayed to get 
misconduct of individual state officers." See also Grice v. United States, (4th Cir. 1945) 
146 F. (2d) 849; Miller v. United States, (3d Cir. 1931) 50 F. {2d) 505; "Admissibility in 
Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained Illegally by State Authorities," 51 CoL. L. R.Ev. 128 
(1951). State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336 at 347, 267 S.W. 858 (1924): "The restrictions of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution apply only to Federal officers. 
The like restrictions in the State Constitution apply only to State officers." Evidence 
obtained by a state officer through unreasonable search can be used in a federal prosecu-
tion, and vice versa. 
The game was slightly blocked by Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 
137 (1927). 
10 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1924), noted 24 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
277 (1925). McBride v. United States, (5th Cir. 1922) 284 F. 416; State v. Lindsey, 192 
Wash. 356, 73 P. (2d) 738 (1937). 
"There is no guaranty [in the Constitution] against searching and seizing, nor against 
searching without a warrant. The question as t~ whether a search is unreasonable does 
not depend altogether on whether a warrant was held by the officer." United States v. 
McBride, (D.C. Ala. 1922) 287 F. 214 at 216, affd. McBride v. United States, (5th Cir. 
1922) 284 F. 416. 
People v. Case, 200 Mich. 379, 190 N.W. 289; Milam v. United States, (4th Cir. 1924) 
296 F. 629 (1924); Lambert v. United States, (9th Cir. 1922) 282 F. 413. 
"The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was sufficient time to obtain 
one, does not destroy the validity of an arrest under these circumstances." Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699 at 705, 68 S.Ct. 1229 (1948). 
11269 U.S. 20 at 32, 46 S.Ct. 4 (1925). 
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a warrant -if one could have been procured-the evidence might 
have disappeared as soon as news of the arrest reached the grape-
vine, and Agnello's conviction would therefore have been im-
possible. It merely laid down a fiat proposition that, "The search 
of a private dwelling without a warrant is, in· itself, unreasonable 
and abhorrent to our laws."12 
The absoluteness of this rule against search of a house without 
a warrant is evidenced by a later state decision.13 Following an 
anonymous tip, an officer for 'two days watched a suspected lottery 
ticket house. Each day "he saw, between the hours of nine and 
eleven o'clock, fifteen or more colored persons, men and women, 
enter the house and thereafter leave, carrying papers in their 
hands." On the third day, some person who entered left the door 
open. The officer followed him in and found Gorman seated at 
a table on which were lottery tickets and money which he was 
puttiI1g into envelopes as other men watched. The court held that 
because the officer's entry had been without a warrant it was 
unreasonable, and the resultant conviction was reversed.14 
However, although the Court postulated that fiat dictum in 
the Agnello case, it made one concession, to the effect that even 
without a warrant search within a house might be reasonable "as 
incident to a lawful arrest therein." But even this limited excep-
12 This, however, was not the first decision to preclude use of evidence obtained by 
search of a house; it was preceded by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 
(1914). The Court in the Agnello case predicated this conclusion not upon reasoned 
evaluation of consequences, buf upon assertion that the unreasonableness "has always 
been assumed," and "Congress has never passed an act purporting to authorize search of a 
house without a warrant." 
The horns of this police dilemma of searching promptly, or risking loss of evidence 
by delaying for a warrant, were sharpened by a later Washington state court decision 
which held a search without a warrant to be unreasonable while at the same time ac• 
knowledging that a valid warrant could not have been issued. Army officers had com• 
plained to the Tacoma police that soldiers were contracting venereal disease in a reputed 
place of prostitution. After watching men in uniform go into the house through an alley 
singly or in pairs and leave soon after, the police entered and found conclusive evidence 
of prostitution. The state supreme court reversed conviction on the strength of a statute 
making it "unlawful for any policemen or other police officer to enter and search any 
private dwelling house or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant." 
The court recognized that "There is no statute in this state authorizing the issuance of a 
search warrant for premises suspected of being used as a house of prostitution or against 
the person suspected of operating such a house." Nevertheless, it held that evidence 
obtained through the search should have been excluded. Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wash. 
(2d) 215 at 219 and 220, 177 P. (2d) 886 (1947). See also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 
582, 66 S.Ct. 1256 (1946). 
13 Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700, 158 A. 903 (1931). 
14 In State v. Andri:ws, 91 W.Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (1922), an officer had been sent to 
Andrew's house to investigate a report that he had assaulted his wife who had been seen 
with blood on her face and making outcry. Finding the house apparently unoccupied and 
the door open the officer entered and saw unlawful whiskey in an open closet. The entry 
was held unreasonable. 
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tion has provoked controversy. As late as 1948 it was made virtu-
ally meaningless by Trupiano v. United States. Federal agents 
were in a position to see the actual manufacture of unlawful alco-
hol through the open door of a rough sort of barn. They entered 
and placed the operator under arrest. Then they seized mash and 
alcohol which was later used in evidence. It was clearly a search 
and seizure after an 'arrest within the building. Nevertheless 
the Supreme Court by a 5-to-4 decision held the seizure unreason-
able and reversed the conviction. Justice Murphy said: 
"Reliance is here placed on the long line of cases recog-
nizing that an arresting officer may look around at the time 
of the arrest and seize those fruits and evidences of crime or 
those contraband articles which are in plain sight and in his 
immediate and discernible presence. We sustain the Govern-
ment's contention that the arrest of Antoniole was valid .... 
The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was 
sufficient time to obtain one, does not destroy the validity 
of an arrest under these circumstances. . . . But we cannot 
agree that the seizure of the contraband property was made 
in conformity with the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, 
law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants 
wherever reasonably practicable. . . . The proximity of the 
contraband property to the person of Antoniole was a fortui-
tous circumstance which was inadequate to legalize the sei-
zure. . . . In other words, the presence or absence of an 
arrestee at the exact time and place of a foreseeable and 
anticipated seizure does not determine the validity of that 
seizure if it occurs without a warrant. Rather the test is the 
apparent need for summary seizure, a test which clearly is 
not satisfied by the facts before us."15 
Even the dissenting justices seem to have agreed that had 
Antoniole happened to see the officers in time to run outside the 
shed before they could catch and arrest him they could not have 
seized the evidence, which was visible just inside the open door, 
until time enough had elapsed for them to locate a magistrate 
and return with a warrant. 
This latter proposition, that arrest outside will not validate 
search inside, still stands, but a change in the Court's personnel 
later produced a 5-to-3 declaration that when an arrest has been 
made within the house "a rule of thumb requiring that a search 
warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be appeal-
111 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 at 704-708, 68 S.Ct. 1229 (1948). 
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ing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot 
agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua 
non to the reasonableness of a search."16 
As the judge-made rule now stands, therefore, if, but only if, 
a valid arrest is made within a house some degree of search is 
permissible without absolute necessity for a warrant. 
Extent of Search 
So far as the search is judicially permitted at all, its extent is 
rigorously limited. In a Michigan case17 the sheriff with a war-
rant for Conway's arrest had entered the house and taken him 
into custody on the ground floor. A deputy sheriff found evidence 
of Conway's guilt in a cache under a removable piece of flooring 
at the head of the stairs. This evidence the state supreme court 
held should not have been used. It recognized that under prior 
decisions "the police have the power . . . to search the room or 
the place in which he is arrested, and also any other place to which 
they can get lawful access, for articles that may be used in evidence 
to prove the charge on which he is arrested."18 But the court 
added: "He [the sheriff] and his officers did not gain lawful access 
to that part of the house where the white mule was kept. There 
they were trespassers." The conviction was reversed for that reason. 
Where the limit is to be drawn, like the other factors of "reason-
ableness," depends not on rule but upon the judges. In Rabino-
witz v. United States,19 only the one-room office, open to the 
public, in which the arrest occurred was searched. Of that search 
the majority opinion says: "In all the years of our Nation's ex-
istence, with special attention to the Prohibition Era, it seems 
never to have been questioned seriously that a limited search 
such as here conducted as incident to a lawful arrest was a reason-
able search and therefore valid." The dissent stood on the ground, 
not that here was search beyond the territorial limits permissible, 
but rather upon the holding in the Trupiano case that no search 
at all should have been made even after the arrest. However, in_ 
Harris v. United States20 the judicial disagreement seems to have 
turned on both territorial extent of the search and upon its 
intensity. 
16 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 at 65, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950). 
17 People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N.W. 679 (1923). 
18 Quoted by the court from Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 93 N.Y.S. 202 (1905) and 
People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641 at 662, 147 N.W. 525 (1914). 
19 339 U.S. 56 at 63, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950). 
20 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098. (1947). 
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In the Harris case, warrants had been issued for the arrest of 
Harris on a charge of using the mails in pursuance of a scheme 
to defraud the Nudge Oil Company. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents went to his apartment where they arrested him by 
virtue of these warrants within the living room. In an effort to 
find $10,000 in cancelled checks believed to have been stolen 
from the Nudge Company and used in perpetrating the fraud, 
these agents searched the living room, bedroom, kitchen and bath 
for several hours-lifting carpets, turning over the mattress, comb-
ing the linen closet, opening drawers, looking into shoes. As J us-
tice Frankfurter put it, ". . . if there was no 'rummaging of the 
place' in this case it would be difficult to imagine what 'rummag-
ing of the place' means." The agents explained that their search 
was for the purpose of locating any means that might have been 
used in commission of the crime, "such as burglar tools, pens, or 
anything that could be used in a confidence game of this type." 
Various instruments such as pens and tissue paper which could 
have been used as instruments of forgery and strips of celluloid 
capable of being used in picking locks were discovered. The checks 
were not found, but in a sealed envelope in a drawer the agents 
discovered evidence of Harris' participation in draft evasion frauds. 
He was brought to trial on this latter charge and the evidence so 
discovered was admitted over his objection. It was contended 
that this evidence had been obtained by unreasonable search and 
should have been suppressed. 
The majority held the search reasonable despite its five-hour 
intensiveness. Of its territorial extent the opinion says: "The 
area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be 
determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took 
place in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the 
apartment." As to its intensiveness: "It is not likely that the 
checks would be visibly accessible. By their very nature they 
would have been kept in some secluded spot. . . . We do not 
believe that the search in this case went beyond that which the 
situation reasonably demanded." But Justices Frankfurter, Mur-
phy, Rutledge and Jackson were of a different opinion to the 
extent of forty-two pages. 
The fact that search within a house is made by stealth rather 
than force, or by entry as a "caller" without any breaking, does not 
negative unreasonableness.21 Nor is search made reasonable by 
21 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921). See also, comment, 3 
BUFFALO L. REv. 283 at 285 (1954). 
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consent of the suspect's wife to the entry;22 nor by the fact that 
there was no one in the house and the officer entered through an 
open door.23 
This judicial permission for a limited amount of search within 
a house has been carefully confined to searches following arrest 
within the house itself. "The search must be made at the place 
of the arrest, otherwise it is not incident to the arrest. . . . A 
search is not incident to the arrest, unless the search is made at 
the place of the arrest, contemporaneously with the arrest."24 
At the moment, then, it appears that, regardless of any possi-
bility that pertinent evidence may disappear, the police are for-
bidden by judicial rule to search within a house without a warrant, 
even though a warrant cannot be obtained, unless the search fol-
lows upon a lawful ap-est within the house, and that the extent of 
this permitted exception depends upon the particular judges' 
notions of propriety rather than on rule. 
Search by Virtue of a Warrant 
In the Harris case Justice Frankfurter paraphrased the majority 
opinion: "Since the search was lawful, anything illicit discovered 
in the course of the search was lawfully seized."25 To this he 
replied: 
"But even if the search was reasonable, it does not follow 
that the seizure [ of the draft evasion evidence] was lawful. 
If the agents had obtained a warrant to look for the cancelled 
checks, they would not be entitled to seize other items dis-
covered in the process .... 26 The court's decision achieves 
the novel and startling result of making the scope of search 
without warrant broader than an authorized search." 
22 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266 (1921). 
23 State v. Andrews, 91 W.Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (1922); Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700, 
158 A. 903 (1931). 
24 Papani v. United States, (9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 160. Here the driver of a car 
was arrested some miles from the house, and "the search [of the house] was not made at 
the place of arrest." Poulos v. United States, (6th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 120 (arrest just 
outside house did not justify search within it). But arrest of a suspect some 20 feet from 
his house as he was fleeing from it to avoid arrest was held to justify immediate search 
of the house, Patton v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. 436, 279 P. 694 (1929). But the court distin-
guished the situation from Wallace v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 143, 275 P. 354 (1929), where 
arrest on the street was held not to justify entry of the house, by the fact that here the 
accused was fleeing from what would immediately have been an arrest within. 
In State v. McClendon, 64 S.D. 320, 266 N.W. 672 (1936), the defendant's room was 
searched and burglar's tools found therein 30 minutes after an arrest within the house; 
evidence held not admissible. 
25 331 U.S. 145 at 163 and 164, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947). 
26 Id. at 164, citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74 (1927). 
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A Michigan decision says flatly: "Except as he followed the 
strict mandate of his warrant to search for and seize if found a 
described quantity of beans the officer was a tres]?asser upon those 
premises." Conviction was reversed because the officer had not 
shut his eyes to evidence of other criminality.27 The Supreme 
Court has ruled that a warrant to search for what is wanted only 
because it is evidence of crime cannot lawfully be issued.28 
Search of Other Structures 
The judicial limitation on search without a warrant has not 
been confined to houses. Anne Johnson had only a hotel room. 
Word had come to detective lieutenant Belland that someone 
was smoking opium in Seattle's Hotel Europe. He and an anti-
narcotics agent went to the hotel where their experienced noses 
led to a room from which came an unmistakable odor. Belland 
knocked and told who he was. After some delay and the sound 
of hurried movement Anne Johnson, alone in the room, opened 
the door. She flatly denied that there was any odor or any opium. 
Belland could have gone for a warrant, and when he returned 
with it there truly would have been no odor or opium. Instead 
he put Anne under arrest and searched at once. Under the bed 
clothes he found opium and a pipe still warm from use. The Su-
preme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held the search "unreason-
able. "29 
27 People v. Preuss, 225 Mich. 115 at 120, 195 N.W. 684 (1923). "Federal narcotic 
officer, on detecting odor of burning opium coming from defendant's home was authorized 
to search premises for violation of Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act only, and not for violation 
of National Prohibition Act." United States v. Boyd, (D.C. Wash. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 1019. 
In State v. Richards, 334 Mo. 485 at 494, 67 S.W. (2d) 58 (1933), it was thought that 
the suspect, charged with robbery and murder, might have taken a 38-caliber revolver. 
A warrant to search for it was issued. A 32-caliber revolver was found and eventually 
offered in evidence. There was reason why it should have been excluded because legally 
irrelevant, but the court put exclusion on the ground also that "the search warrant de-
scribed a certain revolver as the stolen property to be seized under the warrant. Such a 
search warrant did not authorize the officer to seize property not contraband, and there-
fore, the search and seizure of the property [the 32-caliber revolver] in question was not 
authorized." See also State v. Wright, 336 Mo. 135, 77 S.W. (2d) 459 (1934). Tennessee 
judges held it unreasonable to make a second search under a warrant an hour after the 
first search had revealed nothing. McDonald v. State, 195 Tenn. 282, 259 S.W. (2d) 524 
(1953), noted 5 HAsrINGS L.J. 89 (1953). 
In People v. Berger, (Cal. 1955) 282 P. (2d) 509 (1955), conviction of one who had 
collected money for charity and kept it for himself was reversed because the warrant did 
not specify the area to be searched or the thing to be seized. 
28 Gouled v. United States, 225 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921). See also Piedmont v. 
State, 198 Ind. 511, 154 N.E. 282 (1926); State v. Wright, 336 Mo. 135, 77 S.W. (2d) 459 
(1934). 
29 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. IO, 68 S.Ct. 367 (1948). 
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Trupiano occupied only "a roughly constructed barn" which 
he had erected as a shed in which to manufacture untaxed alcohol. 
His conviction was revt:;rsed because federal agents, who had seen 
through the open door what was going on, had entered and seized 
the evidence without a warrant.30 
Indeed these restrictions upon reasonableness of search have 
not been confined to searches of houses or other buildings. Courts 
have reversed, for instance, because the police dug into a garden 
from which they had seen the suspect dig out liquor,31 because 
they searched a sort of dug-out cave with a hole in the roof for 
escape of smoke,32 and a garage unattached to the house.33 
Search of Person 
Search of the person is likewise drastically limited by judicial 
decision. It is consistently permitted following a lawful arrest,34 
but is forbidden after an unlawful one. Arrest and search of a 
wholly innocent person may be lawful if made on reasonable 
ground to believe him guilty of a felony. But arrest of a guilty 
felon, who deserves arrest as a matter of public safety, is held 
unlawful if reasonable ground for belief is absent.35 Hence any 
proof of guilt found after such an arrest must be suppressed despite 
its showing that the suspect was in fact a criminal who ought to 
have been arrested. 
Partly for this reason Judith Coplon went unpunished for 
her attempt to deliver "defense information" to an agent of the 
Soviets. Federal agents with strong reason to suspect her activities 
had trailed her to meetings with her Russian confederate, Gubi-
30 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229 (1948). 
31 Childers v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 848, 250 S.W. 106 (1923). 
32 Morse v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 672, 265 S.W. 37 (1924). 
33 United States v. Slusser, (D.C. Ohio 1921) 270 F. 818. 
The prohibition was held not to extend to a "woodland remote from the dwelling," 
Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 240 S.W. 45 (1922); nor to open fields, Rogers v. 
State, 28 Okla. Crim. 195, 230 P. 279 (1924); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 
445 (1924). See also McCiannan v. Chaplain, 136 Va. I, 116 S.E. 495 (1923). But cf. Allison 
v. State, 189 Tenn. 67, 222 S.W. (2d) 366 (1949), where conviction was reversed because 
officers had investigated a "wood lot" half a mile from the home. 
34 "The rule appears established in this State that search and seizure is not unreason-
able if accomplished without a warrant but as an incident to lawful arrest." Italiano v. 
State, 141 Fla. 249 at 251, 193 S. 48 (1940), cert. den. 310 U.S. 640, 60 S.Ct. 1088 (1940). 
So also United States v. Pisano, (7th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 361; People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 
204, 47 N.E. (2d) 56 (1943); People v. Euctice, 371 III. 159, 20 N.E. (2d) 83 (1939). 
35 People v. Ford, 356 III. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934); People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 
196 N.W. 971 (1924). Here again the declaration that the arrest of the guilty person is 
"unlawful" is an uncompelled judicial choice of decision, which sometimes blandly ignores 
legislation explicitly making it lawful. See Waite, "Public Policy and the Arrest of 
Felons," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 749 (1933). 
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tchev. "On all three occasions the two had wandered aimlessly 
about, meeting, separating, rejoining, going hither and yon, con-
tinually looking back, and in general giving every indication of 
persons who thought they might be shadowed and wished to 
escape being trailed." At two of the meetings the agents could 
see no papers passed to Gubitchev although at one time he reached 
in front of her body and might have got something from her purse. 
At the third meeting both appeared to be acting with even more 
circumspection. The agents arrested them. In her purse they 
found "many incriminating documents, which she almost certainly 
would not have been carrying to such an interview were she not 
intending to pass them to Gubitchev."36 
"In other words, Judith Coplon was participating in the 
commission of a felony in the presence of the F .B.I. agent 
when he took her into custody. The question is, was the 
F.B.I. agent powerless to arrest without warrant for a felony 
which he observed being committed, although a private per-
son in similar circumstances could have done so?"37 
The judges of the Second Circuit answered this in the affirma-
tive; the officer does lack power to arrest. Federal law, they said, 
authorizes such an agent to arrest without warrant "only when 
there is likelihood of [the suspect] escaping before a warrant can 
be obtained for his arrest." In this case they said, "Although the 
judge found that the agent who made the arrest had reason to 
believe that Judith Coplon was likely to escape, we can see no 
basis for the finding." Thus they found that the arrest of the con-
cededly guilty Coplon was "invalid" and the evidence found on 
her person should have been suppressed.38 
36 United States v. Coplon, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629 at 632. 
37 Quoted from Coplon v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 749 at 752. 
38 United States v. Coplon, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629 at 634 and 635. In the 
successor case, on a different indictment, the District of Columbia court said flatly, "We 
cannot suppose that Congress intended ••• to make a Bureau agent powerless to act when 
a felony is committed before his eyes .••. Our conclusion is that the arrest of Judith 
Coplon on March 4, 1949 was lawful." It also reversed conviction, however, because some 
of the evidence used had been obtained by wiretapping. Coplon v. United States, (D.C. 
Cir. 1950) 191 F. (2d) 749 at 754. Certiorari was denied in each case and Coplon has 
escaped conviction. 
The unwillingness of the appellate judges in the Second Circuit to accept the judg• 
ment of the trial judge as to necessity for prompt arrest exemplifies a fairly character• 
istic distrust by judges of their colleagues' capacity for sound conclusions of fact. During 
the trial of Elmer Remmer for income tax evasion, one of the jurors was told casually 
that "Remmer had a lot of money." On appeal from conviction, the Supreme Court 
referred the matter to the district court for a new trial if investigation showed that the 
incident had been prejudicial. Judge Goodman of the district court concluded that it had 
been harmless. Nevertheless, Justice Black "would reverse the judgment of conviction and 
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This rule, that "unreasonable" arrest of one who for the public 
safety ought to have been arrested precludes his conviction by 
evidence thereby discovered, puts the police in an awkward situa-
tion at times. Michigan's statutes make the carrying of concealed 
weapons a felony. After Detroit had suffered a plague of 1367 
armed hold-ups in a year the police commissioner ordered his 
men to arrest every unlawful gun-carrier they could find before 
he tried to use his gun. But guns which are not concealed are 
not unlawful; those which are unlawfully carried are not visible. 
I had opportunity to study the results of this attempt to check 
gun carrying and found that one fourth of all the guilty gun-
toters arrested went unconvicted because judges would not permit 
the truth of their guilt to be shown.39 
What Constitutes Search 
Whether a search is or is not judicially to be stigmatized as 
"unreasonable" is one basis of controversy. Whether a particular 
action by which evidence is obtained constitutes technically a 
"search" is a different question. In McDonald v. United States4° 
it appears that police officers having some reason to believe that 
McDonald's . room in a rooming house was headquarters of a 
"numbers game" lottery, climbed through a window into the land-
lady's room whence they entered the hall, and one of them by 
standing on a chair looked through the transom of McDonald's 
room. On the strength of what the officer saw McDonald was at 
once arrested, and the evidence seen by the officer was used. The 
majority of the Court, in three separate opinions, held the pro-
ceeding to be a search, and unreasonable. Justices Vinson, Bur-
ton and Reed dissented on the ground that, "There was no search. 
There is, therefore, no issue as to the need for a search warrant."41 
grant a new trial in view of the jury incident.''. The public's frequently voiced distrust 
.of the judicial capacity for sound conclusions is perhaps explicable. 
39 See Waite, "Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," 31 MICH. L. REv. 749 (1933). 
See also Kraemer v. State, (Fla. 1952) 60 S. (2d) 615. 
The people of Michigan showed disapproval of this judicial action by amending their 
constitution to authorize evidence as to concealed weapons, and later as to narcotic drugs, 
despite its discovery through unlawful arrest. Art. II, sec. 10, as amended 1936, 1952. 
40 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191 (1948). 
41 Id. at 461. Justice Jackson would have approved use of the evidence had the officers 
been in the hallway itself without trespass. It is not clear from his opinion whether had 
that been the case he would have said that what later transpired was a search but was 
not unreasonable, or that because of the lawful entry to the hallway there was no search 
of McDonald's room. His rather loose expression seems to indicate the latter. • 
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Restrictions Unrelated to Search 
Various other restrictions on police efficiency have been urged 
or actually imposed by judges independently of the search and 
seizure provision. In Olmstead v. United States42 a majority of 
the Court sustained admission of evidence procured by wire-
tapping on the ground that because no trespass on the defendant's 
property had occurred it was not a "search." But Justices Brand-
eis and Holmes would have excluded it on the broad ground that 
it was "unethically" obtained. Subsequently the Court gave effect 
to its disapproval of such methods by its interpretation of the 
legislation forbidding revelation of information acquired by wire-
tapping. As a matter of precedent the Court could have read into 
the statute an implicit exception of revelation in court by judicial 
order.43 It chose, however, to interpret the prohibition adversely 
to maximum police effectiveness.44 
In one decision Justice Murphy, dissenting, voiced a belief 
that: "Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished by 
placing on the outer walls of the sanctum a dictaphone that trans-
mits to the outside listeners the intimate details of a private con-
versation, or by new methods of photography that penetrate walls 
or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded 
by agents of the government and intimate personal matters are 
laid bare to view."45 
In Irvine v. California46 four justices vigorously protested that 
persons should be permitted to carry on in crime if they chose 
without risk of discovery through a microphone concealed in the 
42 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928). 
43 See State v. Gorman, 110 Wash. 330, 188 P. 457 (1920); Church of Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457 at 459, 12 S.Ct. 511 (1892): "It is a familiar rule that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
44 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939); Nardone v. United States 




45 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 at 139, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942). The clear 
implication is that even criminals should be permitted to carry on their nefarious activi-
ties in undisturbed privacy. Justice Brandeis, despite his objection to acquisition of evi-
dence by "unethical" methods, might have disagreed with Justice Murphy as to use of 
devices which penetrate distance. "The testimony of the boatswain shows that he used a 
searchlight .••• Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or 
a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." Brandeis, J., in United States v. 
Lee, 274 U.S. 559 at 561, 47 S.Ct. 746. (1927). 
It is of interest to note that during President Eisenhower's stay in the hospital, news-
men took pictures of him with telescopic cameras. If such an invasion of the presidential 
privacy is legitimate, as it appears to be, one may wonder why Justice Murphy should 
have called similar invasion of a criminal's privacy unreasonable. 
-i6 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). 
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house. Again in On Lee v. United States47 four justices considered 
it "dirty business" rather than effective crime prevention for an 
employee of the Bureau of Narcotics to talk with an opium pur-
veyor in his laundry while wearing a microphone through which 
anti-narcotics officers could hear what was said. Turning the beam 
of a flashlight into an automobile while the officer was examining 
the license of a driver who had violated the traffic law was held 
so unreasonable as to preclude use of what was revealed by the 
light.48 
In another decision proof of guilt was excluded for a rather 
unusual reason. The court thought it "beside the point to con-
sider whether the officers had probable cause to search the appel-
lee's car without a warrant. It is conceivable that they did." But 
it approved suppression of the evidence found by the search be-
cause the judges felt that the police had been unreasonable in 
stopping the suspect's fleeing car by shooting at its tires.49 
One further judicial suppression of truth calls for brief nota-
tion. Federal legislation like that of the states directs that every 
person arrested must be taken immediately before a magistrate. 
Sometimes there are definite advantages to really effective enforce-
ment through momentary disregard of this immediacy. At the 
hearing before the magistrate the police must be prepared to make 
a case technically sufficient for holding the suspect for further 
proceedings. Not infrequently the stress of circumstances neces-
sitates prompt taking of a man into custody before the police can 
.gather the witnesses required for such a showing. In such cases 
presentation before a magistrate is sometimes not precisely prompt. 
In other cases delay has resulted from the mere neglect of careless 
officials. For such delays the detained person has a definite right· 
of action.50 
The Supreme Court, however, has of its o-wn initiative sought 
to persuade the police from such delays by suppressing evidence 
obtained during such a delay. Revenue officers had raided an un-
lawful still; while they were on the premises, one was killed, an-
other wounded by unseen gunmen. The brothers McNabb were 
47 343 U.S. 743, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952). 
48 One Ford Tudor Auto v. State, 207 Okla. 148, 248 P. (2d) 593 (1952). 
149 United States v. Costner, (6th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 23 at 26. 
Using a stomach pump was held a violation of due process rather than unreasonable 
search. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952), discussed in 50 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1367 (1952). 
50 Green v. Kennedy, 46 Barb. (N.Y.) 16 (1866); Pastor v. Regan, 9 Misc. 547, 30 N.Y.S. 
657 (1894); Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N.E. 506 (1900). 
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arrested for the killing and taken first to the local federal building, 
then to jail. The statute provides that persons arrested must be 
taken "immediately" before a magistrate. The McNabbs were 
held from 2 o'clock Thursday afternoon until sometime Saturday 
before being brought before a magistrate. During that period 
they confessed to the killing. Had this confession been in any way 
"compelled" it would of course have been unusable in evidence as 
compelled self-incrimination. Conviction of the McNabbs was 
reversed because the confessions were used in evidence, but the 
Court, though its opinion is singularly vague and indefinite, care-
fully refrained from any suggestion that the confessions were the 
product of either direct or indirect compulsion. Rather, the Court 
suppressed the truth as a rebuke to the officers for their failure to 
take the suspects more promptly before a magistrate.51 The im-
mediate consequence of this decision was failure of a number of 
other apparently deserved convictions.52 
This decision was followed by Upshaw v. United States53 which 
left no possible doubt that reversal was decided on solely and 
simply as a rebuke to the police. "The McNabb confessions were 
thus held inadmissible because the McNabbs were questioned 
while held 'in plain disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress 
upon federal officers' promptly to take them before a judicial 
officer. "54 
51 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943). Justice Reed dissented 
(at p. 349) on the ground that, "If these confessions are otherwise voluntary, civilized 
standards, in my opinion, are not advanced by setting aside these judgments because of 
acts of omission which are not shown to have tended toward coercing the admissions." 
The decision is commented on by the author in 42 MICH. L. R.Ev. 679 (1944). A somewhat 
different discussion is in 53 YALE L.J. 758 (1944). In the McNabb case the defendants did 
not escape punishment entirely; following a second trial and conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter each was sentenced, July 28, 1943, to imprisonment for 9 years, 3 months. In a 
later opinion, Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948), Justice Reed 
(at p. 418) spoke of the McNabb decision as having been made "without the benefit of 
brief or argument." 
A proposal that the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
should embody the purport of this decision in its proposed rules met with vigorous 
criticism from both bench and bar and was rejected. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of 
the F.B.I., condemned it strongly. See 42 MICH. L. R.Ev. 679 at 689 (1944). 
li2 42 MICH. L. R.Ev. 909 (1944), citing hearings before the Judiciary Committee of 
the House, H. Hearings on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st sess., No. 12, p. 46 (1943). The 
McNabb decision was "condemned by the House of Representatives and not acted upon 
by the Senate." 335 U.S. 410 at 434, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948). 
53 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948). 
54 Id. at 413. "Our holding is not placed on constitutional grounds. Since the McNabb 
rule bars admission of confessions we need not and do not consider whether their admis-
sion was a violation of any of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 414, footnote. 
This opens an interesting speculation as to whether the court will extend its indirec-
tion of control to another type of police disregard of statutes. The procedure of extradi-
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So stand the judge-made restrictions on police efficiency and 
the judicial indirection of trying to make them effective. The 
evils are apparent. The conventional theory of crime prevention 
is deterrence through fear-to scare the Devil out of his potential 
disciples by demonstration of what happens to disciples who are 
caught. It may be an unsound theory. Men seem seldom to have 
been deterred from their desires by danger. They travelled the 
Santa Fe trail with laughter at Comanche tortures. They climbed 
the Chilkoot for Yukon gold over the frozen bodies of their pre-
decessors. They drive automobiles on the wrong side of curves. 
But to scare the Devil is the accepted theory and insofar as there is 
deterrence in the threat of punishment for crime the effectiveness 
of that deterrence will increase or diminish with the probability or 
improbability of punishment. Hence it follows ineluctably that by 
every unnecessary limitation the judges place on police efficiency, 
and by every discovered criminal they protect from deserved 
punishment, those judges are derogating from the force of deter-
rence and contributing to the country's already too heavy and in-
creasing burden of crime. 
II 
If deterrence through fear were the only operating preventive 
of crime, or were itself the most effective preventive, discussion 
might well stop here. Judicial contribution to the crime burden 
is already clear. But the ill consequence of judicial decision goes 
farther. 
In every normal human being there functions a strongly com-
pulsive tendency to conform his conduct with the ideals of the 
group of people to which he belongs. The tendency varies in its 
cogency, of course. It must operate differently upon an individual 
holding fast to some desirable position in a close-knit association 
and upon one who is already outcast and perhaps beyond even 
tion from one state to another is precisely specified by statute. Driven to desperation by 
the interminable delays sometimes intervening the police have been known to bring a 
fugitive back for trial by force, or trickery, in utter disregard of the technical provisions. 
Here the legal remedies, though available, are not more practicable than those for un• 
lawful detention after arrest. But so far the courts have not undertaken to rebuke the 
police by refusing to take jurisdiction over the available defendant. Dean v. Ohio, (D.C. 
W.Va. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 937 at 939: "It is virtually a universal rule that where an 
accused is found in a jurisdiction wherein he is charged with a crime, the circumstances 
surrounding bis actual presence within the jurisdiction will not be inquired into. If he 
was brought from another jurisdiction by kidnapping, stratagem or illegal extradition 
he may still be tried if be is presently being held under process legally issued from a 
court of that jurisdiction." See also note, 165 A.L.R. 948 (1946). The problem is dis-
cussed, Plumb, "Illegal Enforcement of the Law,'' 24 CoRN. L.Q. 337 (1939). 
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indifference to further rejection .. Leader and follower, individual-
ist and conventionalist will respond in varying degrees. Never-
theless the force exists,. persistent and strong in its direction and 
control of conduct. It deals with both fundamentals and details. 
Its manifestations are ubiquitous. Given a start it builds automo-
bile driver courtesy in one city, permits gross discourtesy in an-
other. It explains the prevalence of petty theft in one area and its 
relative absence in another where economic conditions are ap-
parently similar}"' It shows itself often stronger than physical 
demands of the body. It can compel men to follow group-approved 
conduct in the face of dangers more frightening and more probable 
than anything threatened by law. Similarly, when group opinion 
clearly condemns some particular form of activity, individuals are 
strongly impelled to abstain from such activity. 
I once asked England's director of public prosecutions why the 
London police did not carry pistols as ours do, if only as a matter 
of self-protection. He considered it amply sufficient explanation 
to say: "Our people would be greatly incensed if any criminal 
were to shoot at a policeman. "56 Yet when the British public was 
unsympathetic with the customs duties on rum and tobacco no 
vigor of enforcement could make them effective. It is agreed that 
laws of which the public approves are easier to enforce than those 
of which it does not. The truth is that this tendency of people to 
conform with the group belief diminishes the need for enforce-
ment. 
Behind this tendency to conform lies not only the compulsive 
fear of group disapproval for discovered nonconformity but also, 
in most men, a conduct control which is independent of either dis-
covery or disapproval. To an undetermined but assumedly con-
siderable extent all behavior is regulated by what the individual 
will think of himself. Whether this control is named conscience, 
or thought habit, or influence of the super ego upon the id, is un-
important here. The fact remains that men do tend to abstain 
55 "The second oldest boy was on probation for railroad larceny. The father does not 
consider this a crime like the daughter's staying out late at night. To steal from the 
manorial forest or from the railroad was not a socially disapproved form of conduct; but 
staying out late at night was frowned on in the peasant village." WooD, HAMTRAMCK-
THEN AND Now 226 (1955). 
56 As the converse: When 17-year-old Frank Santana was arrested for deliberately 
shooting young William Blakenship to death in a New York city gang war he "grinned 
cockily," said he had got the gun because he was afraid of damaging his fists in street 
fights. As he was taken from the police station "three waiting girls, about 14 years old, 
waved and cheered 'I'll always love you, Tarzan,' one shrilled." Another pouted "everyone 
we know is at Warwick" reform school. TIME, May 16, 1955. 
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from conduct which they themselves consider wrong even when 
they have no fear of discovery. And as a rule this "conscience," 
this awareness of what one believes wrongful, feeds upon group be-
lief and shapes itself largely from the expressed opinion of others. 
Obviously, then, both individual conscience and the compul-
sive force of the tendency toward conformity are directly influenced 
by the strength of group ideals, by the definitions, assurance and 
vigor with which they condemn specific behavior. The manner 
in which those ideals are voiced by judicial utterance is therefore 
a major determinant of the country's crime burden. 
Consider, for example, the case of Cosad, Shear and Crane.157 
They had been tried on a charge of rape. The jury convicted 
them of attempt to commit rape. New York's appellate judges, 
however, reversed that conviction on the ground not that the ac-
cused were innocent but that they had in fact committed rape. In 
an earlier case,58 Rizzo, Dorio, Milo and Tomasello armed them-
selves with pistols and set out in an automobile to rob a paymaster 
named Rao. He had left the first job they went to; at the second he 
had not yet arrived. As they looked for him elsewhere, the police, 
suspicious of their movements, picked them up. In due course a 
jury convicted them of attempted robbery. But again New York's 
judges ordered the men set free. The court began its opinion with a 
compliment to the alertness of the police in preventing commission 
of a serious crime, but it set aside the conviction on the ground that 
Rizzo and his pals had not yet begun to attempt. 
In neither case were those judges compelled to their decision 
by statute or precedent. Other courts have affirmed similar con-
victions in essentially similar circumstances.59 Each decision was 
57 People v. Cosad, 253 App. Div. 104 (1937). See also, Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 
55 N.E. 179 (1899); People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921). 
I do not know whether these gross offenders went wholly unpunished or not. It is 
conventional law that conviction of an included offense constitutes acquittal of the offense 
charged, but New York cases appear to be in confusion on the matter. 
-08 People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927). So also, People v. Miller, 2 
Cal. (2d) 527, 42 P. (2d) 308 (1935); People v. Youngs, 122 Mich. 292, 81 N.W. 114 (1899); 
State v. Rains, 53 Mont. 424, 164 P. 540 (1917). 
59 To the effect that success does not preclude conviction for attempt, compare People 
v. Baxter, 245 Mich. 229 at 232, 222 N.W. 149 (1928): "The rule [that success precludes 
conviction of attempt] is not general and does not prevail in this jurisdiction. If an infor-
mation admits of conviction of an attempt to commit a felony, an accused may be found 
guilty of the attempt though the evidence shows a completed offense. Such a verdict may 
be illogical, but the people can not complain, and the defendant must accept it even 
though less in measure than his just deserts; at least he can not be heard to say that he 
has suffered injury." 
State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 (1828), holds that proof of rape will sustain an indict-
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a matter merely of judicial preference. In each case the defendants 
were men of demonstrated unfitness for social freedom who were 
nevertheless given their freedom by judicial fiat. The judges, com-
pletely free so far as any extraneous authority was concerned to do 
what they thought wise, preferred for some unexpressed reason to 
let those men go unpunished. 
The effect of such judicial refusals to punish is far more serious 
than the mere escape of the particular offenders. They cannot fail 
to derogate the basic compulsion of individuals to abstain from 
what public opinion condemns. Not because the decisions dimin-
ish the human instinct for conformity with group ideals, but be-
cause they weaken the apparent strength of those ideals. Group 
notions of what is criminal conduct can be formulated by statute, 
or judicial legislation. But no such simple declaration can raise 
them to the position of group ideals with which conformity is ex-
pected. To that end nothing can so clearly crystallize abstract 
concepts of wrong, or so forcefully emphasize them, or so widely 
disseminate knowledge of their content as the solemn judicial im-
position of punishment for their violation. What makes law ef-
fective is not punishment, but the public declaration that punish-
ment is deserved. It operates as an unmistakable manifestation of 
that group opinion with which men instinctively tend to con-
form. 60 
ment to commit rape. State v. Harvey, 119 Ore. 512 at 515, 249 P. 172 (1926): "Where 
as in this state the statute expressly provides that one charged with the substantive offense 
may be convicted of an attempt to commit that offense thus making the attempt a neces-
sary ingredient of the substantive offense, no sound reason can be advanced for acquitting 
one charged only with the lesser offense upon evidence tending to prove the substantive 
offense." New York does have such a statute: "Upon the trial of an indictment, the . 
prisoner may be convicted of the crime charged, or . . . of an attempt to commit the 
crime." Penal Law, §610. "A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, 
although it appears on the trial that the crime was consummated ..•. " Penal Law, §260. 
As to when an "attempt" begins, cf. Lovett v. State, 19 Tex. 174 (1857). There is no 
rule that there can be no "attempt" while opportunity for possible withdrawal still exists, 
otherwise there could be no criminal attempt until the bullet, as it were, had actually 
been sped upon its way. See also, Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267 at 272, 59 N.E. 
55 (1901), there may be an attempt "although there is still a locus penitentiae in the need 
of a further exertion of the will to complete the crime." People v. Lombard, 131 Cal. 
App. 525, 21 P. (2d) 955 (1933), where there was an "attempt" although the actors lost their 
nerve and quit the undertaking. So also, State v. McCarthy, 115 Kan. 583, 224 P. 44 
(1924), where the defendants could not find the objective of their attempt. People v. 
Stites, 75 Cal. 570, 17 P. 693 (1888); Rex. v. Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865. 
oo This is of course far from a novel proposition. In Bernard Shaw's aphorism, men 
are free to do whatever their government and public opinion permit. 
"The stamping of an act the commission of which the State will prosecute with 
unrelenting severity, immediately arouses the feeling that the act is unsuitable, inadmis-
sible, disreputable, contrary to duty .•.. Thus general prevention operates rather quietly, 
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But conversely, every judicially expressed opinion which 
minimizes the wickedness of an action, or which even by indirec-
tion palliates alleged wrongdoing, or which condones crime of 
any sort, weakens the apparent strength of group ideals and thereby 
diminishes the tendency of individuals to conform. What one 
man can flout without condemnation, another will flout. What 
judges palliate, other men will palliate. 
I do not mean to suggest that an unnecessary judicial reversal 
of conviction for murder or rape will promptly produce an in-
crease in murder or rape. The innate hostility of people to such 
action is too deep to be destroyed by casual judicial indifference. 
But indifference toward any wrongdoing fosters indifference to-
ward all wrongdoing, and every judicial failure to condemn where 
condemnation is deserved encourages the whole fringe area where-
in delinquency, vandalism and racketeering lead eventually to 
robbery and murder.61 
The Cosad and Rizzo reversals were not unique. Rather, they 
represent many generations of apparent judicial . indifference to 
effective law enforcement-a long practice of reversals predicated 
on narrowly sophistic reasoning. In the days when English crimi-
nal laws were irrationally harsh and the Bishop of Rochester could 
ask in Parliament the purely rhetorical question, "What have the 
masses to do with a law save to obey it?" there may have been an 
oblique sort of justification for the judicial indifference to effec-
tive enforcement. Sir James Stephen says of their technicalities: 
slowly and penetratingly, making the consciousness of right sharper, intensifying the 
general feeling for right and wrong .... " AsCHAFFENBtlRG, CRIME AND rrs REPRESSION 259 
(1913). 
"Great part of the general detestation of crime which happily prevails amongst the 
decent part of the community in all civilized countries arises from the fact that the 
commission of offenses is associated in all such communities with the solemn and delib-
erate infliction of punishment whenever crime is proved ..•• The sentence of the law is 
to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offense what a seal is to hot wax. 
It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient senti-
ment .... The criminal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to 
hate criminals, and confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals 
punishments which express it. I think that whatever effect the administration of criminal 
justice has in preventing the commission of crime is due as much to this circumstance as 
to any definite fear entertained by offenders of undergoing ~ specific punishment." Sm 
JAMES STEPHEN, 2 HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 79 (1883). 
0
61 "It is becoming increasingly embarrassing in our clinics to answer the child who 
says: 'Why worry about me cheating in school-read the m,wspapers and you'll see I'm 
just in training to be a successful adult.' This of course represents in part a rationaliza-
tion, but only in part. It is most likely that our teen-agers are much more influenced in 
their behavior by the headlines than by the comics." Dr. Ralph D. Rabinovitch, U. of 
Mich. Neuropsychiatric Institute, in MICH. DAILY, May 22, 1955. · 
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"The tendency was to make the administration of justice a solemn 
farce. Such scandals do not seem, however, to have been unpopu-
lar. Indeed I have some doubt whether they were not popular, 
as they did mitigate, though in an irrational, capricious manner, 
the excessive severity of the old criminal law .... In short it is 
scarcely a parody to say, that from the earliest times to our own 
days, the law relating to indictments was much as if some small 
proportion of the prisoners convicted had been allowed to toss 
up for their liberty."62 
The circumstances which created that justification-if it was a 
justification-long ago disappeared, but the reversal of deserved 
convictions has never ended. Only the judicial excuses have 
changed, through a variety of phases. Sophistry has been peren-
nial. Semantics has sometimes given a pretense of reason. James 
Harris had his conviction of stealing a pair of boots reversed be-
cause he had actually stolen two for the right foot and the appel-
late judges could not consider them a "pair."63 Richard Marsh 
got his reversed because he had been charged with stealing a "cow 
or animal of the cow kind" and the appellate judges said that 
the steer which he had stolen was male and could not be con-
sidered of the cow kind. 64 
Mere formalism also sufficed appellate judges as a pretext for 
reversal. Men guilty of rape found their convictions upset because 
a word, "the," had been omitted from the accusation's conven-
tional conclusion, "against the peace and dignity of [the] State";611 
others profited because the name of the state had been omitted, 66 
or abbreviated.67 Illinois judges reversed one Goldberg's convic-
tion on fifty charges because his name had been spelled Holdberg 
in one charge.68 The variety of judicial excuses has been unend-
ing. "It may be shown by the most irrefragable proof that the • 
defendant is guilty of the offense charged," said Wisco~sin judges, 
but his conviction will be reversed if the rules of evidence have 
been violated;69 even, said a Nebraska court, though the evidence 
621 HrsrORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 284 (1883). 
63 State v. Harris, 3 Del. 559 (1841). 
64 Marsh v. State, 3 Ala. App. 80, 57 S. 387 (1912). 
65 State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 706 (1907); State v. Warner, 220 Mo. 23, 
119 S.W. 399 (1909). Repudiated, State v. Adkins, 284 Mo. 680, 225 S.W. 981 (1920). 
66 Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402 (1871). 
67 Lemons v. State, 4 W.Va. 755, 6 Am. Rep. 293 (1870). All these decisions and an 
appalling array of similar absurdities are collected and discussed by Perkins, "Absurdities 
in Criminal Procedure," 11 IOWA L. REv. 297 (1926). 
68 People v. Goldberg, 287 ill. 238, 122 N.E. 530 (1919). 
69 Schoser v. State, 36 Wis. 429 at 434 (1874). 
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rejected "would not have proved any fact of the least value in the 
case had it been properly admitted."70 
Through public criticism and legislative pressure71 these older 
judicial excuses for reversal have happily fallen more or less into 
disrepute and desuetude. The latest outstanding extravaganza 
I know is a Texas decision of 1945. Chesley Arthur Gragg had 
been convicted of drowning his wife, but appellate judges set the 
conviction aside because the charge had not informed Gragg 
"whether the deceased was drowned in water, coffee, tea, or 
what."72 
The judicial excuses change, yes. Obvious sophistry has given 
place to Justice Frankfurter's "deepest feeling" against giving 
sanction to the "dirty business" of law enforcement,73 and to the 
personal notions of judges as to how the police should behave. 
But judicial reversals still continue. The judicial damage to 
crime prevention still persists. To the simple citizen who hears 
of guilty men exempted from punishment by judicial decision it 
matters nothing what ulterior motive lies in the judicial mind. 
He knows only that the activities of a dope-peddler, a notorious 
numbers racketeer, a score of gun-toters, a counterfeiter, or a rob-
ber have. not been considered wrongful enough by the judges to 
justify conviction. Thus the harm is accomplished~· the group 
70 Masters v. Marsh, 19 Neb. 458 at 467, 27 N.W. 438 (1886). 
71 "Only an American court could announce so extraordinary a decision. In no other 
English speaking country would the people tolerate such a perversion of justice. . . . It 
clearly was not the force of authority but the instinct for technicality that brought about 
this decision. It is only an example of a tendency which manifests itself in a thousand 
ways .... We can only hope that the next fifteen years will show more progress in making 
procedure the servant of justice than the last fifteen have shown." E. R. Sunderland in 
17 MICH. L. REv. 406 (1919). 
"One of the most deplorable shortcomings of our present criminal law system is the 
frequency with which convictions are reversed and the penalty avoided because of some 
formal or technical error." 23 MICH. L. REv. 528 at 529 (1925). 
Ohio Code (Page, 1939) § 13437-25: variances in name or description shall not be 
ground for acquittal unless found to be material to the merits . 
. 12 Gragg v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. Rep. 267, 186 S.W. (2d) 243 (1945). The several 
opinions are in conflict with each other and the phrasing of some is confused so that it 
cannot be said that the court as a whole ordered the "cause dismissed" for this particular 
reason. But it did play a part and the conviction was reversed. See also Northern v. 
State, 150 Tex. Crim. 511, 203 S.W. (2d) 206 (1946). An elderly woman had picked up an 
IS-year-old hitchhiker who ordered her out in a secluded spot. The charge read, "Buster 
Northern ... did then and there unlawfully, voluntarily and with malice aforethought, 
kill Fannie McHenry by then and there kicking and stamping the said Fannie McHenry." 
Reversed because the accusation did not say that the kicking and stamping were done with 
his feet. 
In Tate v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 571, 223 S.W. (2d) 634 (1949), conviction was reversed 
because the locality was alleged as "U.S. Highway No. 108 about two miles north of the 
city of Stephenville," and the evidence mentioned only "Highway No. 108" as the place 
stated. 
73 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 743, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952). 
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ideals are depreciated; the potentiality of abstention through con-
formity with group idealism is derogated; the crime burden is 
increased. 
Some types of decisions have become obsolescent, and their 
place is being filled by reversals and releases motivated by judicial 
wish to control the police. This alters only the judicial excuse 
and does not better the consequences. On the contrary this new 
judicial reason for reversal, while it has the same adverse effect 
as the old reasons on deterrence and innate abstention from crime, 
adds to that damage the judicial interference with enforcement 
efficiency. 
Two implicit questions are thereby raised. Is there some 
social advantage compensatory of the harm done in this effort 
indirectly to control the police? If not, can the evil of this con-
tinued derogation of the public attitude toward crime be remedied? 
As to possible public profit from the suppression of evidence 
and the release of knmvn offenders no one can answer dogmati-
cally; we have no real information. It is often asserted that no 
other practicable restraint of police over-zeal exists. It is true that 
direct action against the police by guilty persons who have been 
discovered by "unreasonable" methods will seldom be instituted 
because neither judge nor jury would award more than nominal 
damages. But innocent citizens whose privacy has been improper-
ly invaded have recovered substantial judgments often enough to 
indicate that direct action is amply sufficient to prevent oppres-
sion.74 It might well be noted in this connection that constitutions 
forbid unreasonable seizures of the person as well as unreasonable 
searches. Yet unlawful arrest is held satisfactorily in check by 
direct action; it has not become commonplace even though judges 
have not undertaken to control it by refusal to convict merely 
because the defendant was unlawfully arrested.75 
74 "If a police officer, by force, makes search of persons, or 'compels them to submit 
to it, he becomes a trespasser and for the wrong is civilly answerable; and he commits an 
indictable misdemeanor, the offense being aggravated because of his official relation and 
the abuse of its rightful powers.' " Ex parte City of Mobile, 251 Ala. 539 at 541, 38 S. (2d) 
330 (1949). 
Action in tort for damages from unlawful search of a house sustained: McClurg v. 
Brenton, 123 Iowa 1168, 98 N.W. 881 (1904); McMahan's Admx. v. Draffen, 242 Ky. 785, 
47 S.W. (2d) 716 (1932); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946) (action against 
agents of the F.B.I.). Search of a suitcase for liquor, damages for mental suffering approved: 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. State, 121 Miss. 369, 83 S. 610 (1919). "Two 
suits brought by Hector Verburg, janitor in the spectacular Susanne Degnan murder case 
two years ago for $125,000 damages for false arrest against 17 Chicago policemen were 
settled for $20,000 yesterday." CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 1948. 
75 "An illegal arrest does not prevent one from being validly indicted and tried.'' 
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But even if protection of the guilty by suppression of the evi-
dence against them were truly essential to protection of the inno-
cent from undue molestation, does the judicial method really 
conduce to that end? It might have had some such effect in Eng-
land prior to establishment in 1829 of the present type of police. 
Before that it was common for constables and other enforcement 
officers greatly to enlarge their official incomes through sharing in 
forfeitures or fines and from rewards for convictions brought about 
through their efforts.76 A judicial shutting off of those personal 
financial benefits because of improper activity might well have 
had a direct effect on police conduct. But that situation is alto-
gether changed. It may distress and annoy the police to find that 
criminals they discover are freed by the judges, but it no longer 
touches their pocketbooks or themselves personally in any other 
way. 
Oddly enough, the very judges who use the suppression method 
are not in· agreement that it does improve police behavior. Jus-
tice Murphy has said: 
"The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy 
exists to deter violations of the search and seizure clause. 
That is the rule which excludes illegally obtained evidence. 
Only by exclusion can we impress on the zealous prosecutor 
that violation of the Constitution will do him no good. And 
only when that point is driven home can the prosecutor be 
expected to emphasize the importance of observing constitu-
tional demands in h1s instructions to the police."77 
Finch v. Warden, 194 Md. 728 at 729, 71 A. (2d) 301 (1950); People v. Miller, 235 Mich. 
340, 209 N.W. 81 (1926), 25 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1926). 
76 See the excellent article by Radzinowicz, "Trading in Police Services," 102 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 1 (1953). 
77 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 44, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949), continuing, "if proof of 
the efficacy of the federal rule were needed, there is testimony in abundance in the recruit 
training programs and in-service courses provided the police in states which follow the 
federal rule." 
This was quoted with approval by Douglas, J., dissenting, Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128 at 151, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). 
But Justice Murphy, had he investigated be>th sides, might have found even more 
-such training in states which do not follow the federal rule. Dean 0. W. Wilson of the 
University of California School of Criminology writes me in reply to a question: 
"Police training, almost without exception, includes instruction on the legal restric-
tions imposed on the police for the purpose of protecting individual rights. It can be 
said, therefore, that the extent of instruction in problems of search and seizure is very 
nearly in direct proportion to the extent of police training. In respect of police training, 
none of the states that follow the federal rule of exclusion equals two non:exclusion 
states: Ca}ifornia, the most progressive_ of all in police training, and New York, an early 
leader in this field. With the exception of Michigan and Indiana, the states that follow 
the federal rule have not distinguished themselves in police training; most of them, in 
fact, are among the more backward states in this respect. In contrast, some non-exclusion 
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Five years later, however, Justice Jackson in a majority opinion 
notes, 
"That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the es-
cape of guilty persons is more capable of demonstration than 
that it deters invasion of rights by the po~ice. . . . It deprives 
society of its remedy against one law breaker because he has 
been pursued by another. It protects one against whom in-
criminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to pro-
tect innocent persons who are victims of illegal but fruitless 
searches. The disciplinary or educational effect of the court's 
releasing the defendant for police misbehavior is so indirect 
as to be no more than a mild deterrent at best. . . . It appears 
to the writer, in which view he is supported by the Chief 
Justice, that there is no lack of remedy if an unconstitu-
tional wrong has been done in this instance without upsetting 
a justifiable conviction of this gambler."78 
states have superior training programs. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kansas, and Minnesota are 
examples." [The foregoing reference to California as a non-exclusion state was written 
before that state's 1955 change.-Ed.] , 
78 Irvine v. California, 347 U,S. 128 at 136 and 137, 74 S,Ct. 381 (1954). So also Justice 
Clark concurring (at 138): "We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, 
but we do not shape the conduct of local police one whit." 
Compare also, Bourquin, J., in United States v. Rogers, (D.C. N.J. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 874 
at 876, 877: "It [the Fourth Amendment] was designed to be a shield for the innocent; 
old John [Barleycorn] has converted it to a spear of aggression for the guilty. And the 
amount of judicial sanction his arrogance has received is one of the most shocking and 
alarming developments of the prohibition experiment .•.. If America is the most criminal 
country on earth, and it is, if the laws herein are most poorly enforced and justice most 
weakly administered, as they are, the aforesaid reprehensible treatment of officers of the 
law is a large contributing cause." Contrast Hutcheson, J., in In re Ginsburg, (2d Cir. 
1945) 147 F. (2d) 749 at 750: "It may not be doubted ..• that the decisional gloss which 
constitutes the common law of the Constitution has created in the federal courts a climate 
of opinion favorable to the citizen, less favorable to his oppressors." 
Exclusion is commented on favorably in Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 
S.W. 860 (1920); Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 753, 98 S. 233 (1923); unfavorably in People 
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 
(1923). A similar contrariety of opinion by commentators has been verbose and sometimes 
acrimonious. E.g., 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940); Corwin, "The Supreme 
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 29 MICH. L. REv. I (1930); Harno, 
"Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure," 19 ILL. L. REv. 303 (1925); Waite, 
"Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1944); Grant, "Constitu-
tional Basis of the Rule Forbidding Use of Illegally Seized Evidence," 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 
60 (1941). See also Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained," 25 CoL. L. REv. 11 
(1925); Chafee, "Searches and Seizures," 35 HARV. L. REv. 694 (1922); 34 HARV. L. REv. 
361 (1921); 36 YALE L.J. 536, 988 (1927); Wood, "Scope of the Constitutional Immunity 
Against Searches and Seizures," 34 W.VA. L.Q. 1 (1927); 11 CORN. L.Q. 250 (1926); 14 
N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 79 (1937). 
"The thesis that the suppression of unreasonably seized evidence discourages illegal 
police action has never been proved. The number of illegal search cases in jurisdictions 
which subscribe to the exclusionary rule seems to belie this hope." 35 MINN. L. REv. 457 
at 468 (1951). 
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The actual profit to society from these reversals is quite as 
unprovable in fact as these contradictory judicial speculations 
would indicate. However, considerable evidence that their effect on 
police conduct is not desirable does exist. Inability to obtain de-
served convictions through the courts has driven the police to meth-
ods less desirable than those for which the judges shut truth from 
the jury's ears. In Detroit, for illustration, the police raided a "blind 
pig" wherein they found liquor and a still. On the scanty facts 
which could have been presented to a magistrate it was highly 
improbable that a warrant would have been issued,79 although 
the police were certain enough to risk what would have been 
serious consequences to themselves personally had they been 
wrong. Knowing that they could not get a conviction they sought 
to put the proprietor out of business by destroying his bar and 
equipment. The building was used also as a dwelling and because 
the police went so far a-s to smash furniture unrelated to the busi-
ness part the affair came to public knowledge. The officers were 
disciplined, but at the same time the police commissioner admitted 
that he had himself given orders to raiders to wreck the bars and 
:fixtures of such places. Mayor Murphy, later Justice Murphy, 
ordered a revocation of that order, but it was fairly common knowl-
edge that the practice continued.80 
On the other hand, so far as I have been able to discover, no 
evidence has ever been produced to the effect that the police in 
rejection and reversal states are better behaved or less prone to 
unreasonable action than are those in states which allow convic-
tion of the guilty and rely on direct action to keep the police in 
order. 
Although this judicial suppression of truth seems to produce 
no social benefit, its interference with effective law enforcement 
is widely-apparent. I have already referred to the change in Mich-
igan's constitution resulting from the judicial interference with 
attempts to check the carrying of concealed weapons.81 In Mary-
land also, for similar reasons, the legislature went through illumi-
nating C:hanges of heart. The state courts had consistently held 
.that otherwise admissible evidence would not be rejected merely 
79 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, (8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 85; United States v. 
Williams, (D.C. Pa. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 184; Wallace v. State, 199 Ind. 317, 157 N.E. 657 (1927). 
so I saw it in operation on occasions myself. For a discussion of the particular inci-
dent, see DErRoIT SATURDAY NIGHT, Nov. 22, 1930, which comments, "Whatever one may 
think of this method of enforcing laws, it was effective. To begin with the action was 
extremely costly to the pigger .••. The raids themselves sufficed to put fear in the hearts 
of the wet proprietors and probably did more than anything else to increase the town's 
aridity." . 
81 See note 39 supra. 
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because it had been obtained by unlawful search. In 1929, how-
ever, the legislature forbade the use of such evidence in prosecu-
tions for misdemeanors, leaving it still usable in felony cases. But 
the effect on enforcement was such that in 1935 the statute was 
changed to make the evidence again usable against narcotics law 
violators. Still later, prosecutions for carrying concealed weapons 
were exempted from the prohibition. Finally, by 1953, the prohi-
bition against use of the evidence had been repealed, first in respect 
of gambling cases and then of liquor law violations, in certain of 
the more populous counties.82 
Assuming that the social harni of these judicial refusals of 
conviction is, as appears to be. the fact, without discoverable com-
pensatory advantage, how can the situation be remedied? Possibly 
by legislation if necessary. The people of Michigan became suffi-
ciently incensed by judicial release of discovered gun-toters to 
insist by constitutional amendment that evidence of the truth be 
recognized by the courts in concealed weapon and narcotic drug 
cases.83 If the change of rule could be wisely and properly made 
for that type of case it could be similarly made for all types. But, 
indeed, resort to the delay and effort of constitutional amendment 
would not be necessary. If the assertion of Justice Black is sound 
-and I have not seen it controverted-that "the federal exclusion-
ary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a 
judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate,"84 
then action by Congress, or state legislatures would be enough to 
abrogate the exclusion without need for constitutional amend-
ment. Such legislation would, of course, affirm the prohibition of 
unreasonable search or seizure. It might even strengthen existing 
remedies against the perpetrators of unreasonable search or seizure 
and broaden the scope of punitive action against them. It could 
in some such way counter the specious though sometimes plausible 
82 See Salsburg v. State, 201 Md. 212, 94 A. (2d) 280 (1952), affd. United States v. 
Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 74 S.Ct. 280 (1954). 
83 Art. II, §10 (1936), firearms, blackjacks, etc., seized outside the curtilege of a dwell-
ing house shall not be excluded as evidence in criminal cases. Narcotic drugs were covered 
by further amendment in 1952. 
84 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 39, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). Even Justices Murphy 
and Rutledge, dissenting from the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply the Fourth to the states, speak of the "judicial exclusion of evidence" as one of 
three "alternatives" which should be followed because it is wiser and more practical than 
the others, not as something the Constitution itself compels. So, too, the California court 
in its 1955 change from admission of relevant evidence [See People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 
237, 205 P. 435 (1922)] to adoption of the federal rule of e.xclusion does not suggest that 
for a century California courts had been ignoring the dictates of their constitution. Instead 
they frankly recognize their action as a change in judicial policy. People v. Cahan, (Cal. 
1955) 282 P. (2d) 905. See also notes 7 and 8 supra. 
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judicial argument that only by refusal to convict criminals can the 
public be protected against its own police. But whether or not 
it should go so far, legislatures can by statutory enactment forbid 
their judges from concealing truth in the trial of cases. 85 
But remedy lies also within the power of the judges themselves, 
without need for even legislative action. They some while ago 
gave up their penchant for sophistries of form and semantics when 
they saw it wise. They can, if they will, discard now their present 
motives for reversal. Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy once 
said of patent law rules which they did not like, "This Court was 
responsible for their creation.· . . . This Court should take the 
responsibility for their removal."86 In another case Justice Jack-
son remarked, "I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong 
today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday."87 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has not infrequently reversed its earlier prac-
tices.88 
By their self-assumed power to regulate and control the police, 
instead of leaving the duty to legislature and executive, by the 
limitations they seek to impose on crime-preventive efficiency, 
and, particularly, by their derogation of the public's attitude to-
ward crime and criminals, judges have made themselves partly 
responsible for the country's burden of crime. They can free them-
selves of that responsibility and lessen the country's burden when 
they will, without need for legislation. Perhaps they will when 
the public appreciates the situation and makes evident its wishes.89 
85 A Maryland statute providing that evidence procured by illegal search should not 
be admissible except in prosecution for violation of the gambling laws in certain counties 
was held valid in Salsbury v. State, (Md. 1953) 94 A. (2d) 280. Of course where, as in 
Michigan, the court is by constitution given power to make rules of procedure there could 
be question of the scope of its power as to rules of evidence. 
86 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 383 and 384, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945). 
87 Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 at 639-640, 68 S.Ct. 747 (1948). 
88 E.g., Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943), 
••Tue decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis •.• [is] ••• over-
ruled." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 116, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941), "The conclusion 
is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U.S. 251) was a departure from the prin-
ciples which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause. • . . It should 
be and now is overruled." West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 at 397, 400, 57 
S.Ct. 578 (1937), "The decision in the Adkins case was a departure from the true applica-
· tion of the principles governing the regulation by the State of the relation of employer 
and employed. • . . There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent 
economic experience has brought into a strong light. . . . Our conclusion is that the case 
of Adkins v. Children's Hospital (261 U.S. 525) should be, and it is, overruled." For other 
instances see Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 at 401, n. 52, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943). 
What the 1955 California court did in repudiating its old rule and adopting the rule 
of exclusion [People v. Cahan, (Cal. 1955) 282 P. (2d) 905] other courts have power to do 
in reverse, by repudiating their rule of exclusion. 
89 As Mr. Dooley once observed, "No matter whether th' Constitution follows th' flag 
or not, th' Supreme Court follows th' illection returns." DUNN, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26. 
